Competition and Antitrust Law in Australia: Market Regulation, Restrictive Practices, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

Introduction

Competition law is a central part of Australia’s economic and regulatory framework. It governs how businesses compete, how markets are structured, and how commercial power may be exercised. Its purpose is not simply to prevent large companies from becoming successful or to protect individual competitors from ordinary commercial pressure. Rather, it seeks to preserve competitive markets in which businesses must respond to consumer demand, improve efficiency, innovate, and compete on the merits of their products and services.

The Australian system is principally built around the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), particularly the Australian Consumer Law and the competition provisions contained in Parts IV and related parts of the Act. The legislation regulates cartel conduct, anti-competitive agreements, misuse of market power, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, and mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. It also establishes a framework for enforcement, investigations, penalties, private actions, and remedies.

The principal competition regulator is the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). It investigates suspected breaches, monitors markets, reviews proposed mergers, brings enforcement proceedings, and promotes compliance with competition and consumer law. Courts, particularly the Federal Court of Australia, determine contested legal proceedings and impose judicial remedies and penalties.

Australian competition law has also undergone significant institutional and legislative development. A particularly important recent change is the introduction of a mandatory and suspensory merger notification regime, which commenced on 1 January 2026. This reform replaced the former predominantly voluntary notification model with a system under which acquisitions meeting specified thresholds must be notified to the ACCC and cannot ordinarily be completed before regulatory approval.

Understanding Australian competition law therefore requires attention to both its substantive prohibitions and its institutional machinery. The law regulates individual business conduct, agreements between competitors, relationships between suppliers and customers, and structural changes that may alter the competitive conditions of entire markets.

1. The legal foundations of Australian competition law

1.1 The Competition and Consumer Act 2010

The principal statute is the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). It replaced the former Trade Practices Act 1974 and provides the national legislative framework for regulating competition and consumer protection. Its object includes enhancing the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading, while providing for consumer protection.

The Act applies across the Australian economy, including manufacturing, retail, financial services, telecommunications, transport, energy, digital markets, professional services, and government procurement. Its competition provisions are principally found in Part IV, although other parts of the Act establish related regulatory powers and industry-specific arrangements.

The central provisions address several distinct forms of conduct:

• Anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices, including arrangements between competitors that substantially lessen competition.
• Cartel conduct, such as price fixing, market allocation, output restriction, and bid rigging.
• Misuse of market power, where a business with substantial market power engages in conduct with the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.
• Exclusive dealing, involving conditions that restrict a trading partner’s commercial freedom and substantially lessen competition.
• Resale price maintenance, through which suppliers seek to impose minimum resale prices.
• Anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, where an acquisition has the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.

These prohibitions are not identical in their operation. Some conduct, particularly cartel conduct and resale price maintenance, is prohibited by specific statutory rules. Other conduct is unlawful only when the relevant competition test is satisfied. The distinction matters: a commercial arrangement may appear restrictive without necessarily contravening the Act.

The current legislation should be consulted in its latest compilation, rather than relying on older summaries of the former Trade Practices Act. The Federal Register identifies the latest compilation of the CCA as Compilation 166, dated 27 August 2026. Federal Register of Legislation+1

1.2 Federal jurisdiction and the national character of the regime

Competition law in Australia is predominantly federal. The CCA establishes a national framework intended to prevent businesses from avoiding competition obligations by operating across state or territory boundaries.

The legislation also addresses the application of competition rules to certain government and public-sector activities. Its provisions concerning the Commonwealth, states, territories, local government bodies, and government authorities recognise that public entities may participate in commercial markets and that their activities can have significant competitive consequences.

The national framework does not mean that every economic regulatory question is exclusively a matter for the ACCC. Australian markets are also subject to sector-specific regulation, including rules concerning telecommunications, energy, financial services, transport, and infrastructure. The ACCC itself performs some functions under both general competition legislation and specialised regulatory regimes.

1.3 The economic meaning of competition

Competition is not simply the existence of several businesses selling similar products. It is a process through which businesses independently seek customers, suppliers, investment, and commercial opportunities.

A market may be competitive even if it contains only a small number of businesses, provided that those businesses face meaningful constraints from actual or potential competitors, customers, imports, or alternative products. Conversely, a market with numerous suppliers may still exhibit weak competition if customers cannot realistically switch, entry is difficult, or businesses coordinate their conduct.

Competition analysis therefore considers matters such as:

• the availability of alternative products or services;
• the ability of customers to change suppliers;
• barriers to entry and expansion;
• the bargaining power of suppliers and purchasers;
• the importance of economies of scale;
• access to essential infrastructure or distribution channels;
• the effect of technology and innovation;
• the likelihood of new competitors entering the market.

The law seeks to protect the competitive process, rather than guaranteeing that every business will survive or achieve a particular level of profitability. A competitor may lawfully lose customers because another business offers lower prices, better quality, more convenient services, or a more innovative product. Competition law intervenes when commercial conduct crosses the statutory boundary into prohibited anti-competitive behaviour.

2. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

2.1 Establishment and functions

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is the principal national regulator responsible for enforcing competition and consumer protection laws. It is an independent statutory authority established under the CCA.

Its responsibilities include:

1. investigating suspected anti-competitive conduct;
2. enforcing the cartel prohibitions;
3. reviewing mergers and acquisitions;
4. examining misuse of market power and restrictive trading practices;
5. monitoring market conditions and industry developments;
6. administering statutory authorisation and notification processes;
7. bringing civil enforcement proceedings;
8. referring serious cartel conduct for criminal prosecution;
9. publishing guidance and promoting compliance.

The ACCC does not itself determine every legal dispute or impose judicial penalties. It investigates, gathers evidence, makes regulatory decisions within its statutory powers, and may commence proceedings. Courts determine contested liability and impose penalties and other judicial remedies.

The ACCC also has a broader market-monitoring role. It may examine sectors in which competition appears weak, investigate conduct affecting consumers or businesses, and publish reports on structural problems in particular industries. Such work can identify issues that are not necessarily confined to a single alleged contravention.

2.2 Investigative powers

The ACCC has statutory powers to obtain information and documents and to investigate suspected contraventions. Depending on the relevant statutory provisions and circumstances, it may:

• require persons to provide information or produce documents;
• examine individuals under compulsory examination powers;
• obtain search warrants;
• inspect business records and electronic material;
• gather evidence from customers, suppliers, competitors, and other third parties;
• seek injunctions and other court orders.

These powers are important because anti-competitive arrangements are often concealed. Cartel members may use informal conversations, encrypted messages, coded language, or intermediaries rather than formal written agreements. Investigators may therefore need to reconstruct the arrangement from communications, financial records, tender documents, pricing patterns, and witness evidence.

The exercise of compulsory powers is subject to statutory safeguards and legal requirements. Businesses and individuals receiving compulsory notices should take them seriously and obtain appropriate legal assistance. Failure to comply with a lawful requirement may itself create legal consequences.

2.3 Enforcement priorities and regulatory discretion

The ACCC cannot investigate every complaint or suspected breach. It therefore establishes enforcement priorities and allocates resources according to the potential harm to competition and consumers, the seriousness of the conduct, the available evidence, and the likelihood that enforcement action will produce meaningful results.

Its priorities may include conduct affecting essential services, vulnerable consumers, small businesses, public procurement, digital markets, or industries in which competition is particularly important to the wider economy.

An ACCC investigation does not automatically mean that a contravention has occurred. The Commission must assess the evidence and the applicable legal test. Equally, the fact that the ACCC has not commenced proceedings does not necessarily establish that particular conduct is lawful.

The regulator’s general guidance is useful for understanding its approach, but the statute and judicial decisions remain the authoritative sources of law. ACCC+2

3. Anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices

3.1 Section 45: agreements that substantially lessen competition

Section 45 of the CCA prohibits certain contracts, arrangements, understandings, and concerted practices that have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.

The provision recognises that businesses can restrict competition without forming a traditional cartel. Two companies might coordinate their commercial strategies, agree to limit their dealings with a particular customer, or cooperate in ways that reduce competitive pressure in a market.

The statutory concept of an arrangement or understanding is broader than a formally enforceable contract. An informal understanding may be sufficient if the evidence establishes the required degree of commitment or consensus. The parties do not necessarily need to sign a document or use explicit legal language.

However, ordinary commercial contact is not automatically unlawful. Businesses may communicate with suppliers, customers, industry bodies, and competitors for legitimate purposes. The central question is whether the relevant arrangement or concerted practice satisfies the statutory test.

3.2 The substantial lessening of competition test

The expression substantially lessening competition is central to Australian competition law. It requires an assessment of whether the conduct materially weakens the competitive process in the relevant market.

The inquiry is not limited to whether prices increase immediately. Competition may be harmed through reduced innovation, lower product quality, fewer choices, diminished service standards, or the creation of barriers that make it harder for competitors to enter or expand.

A court may consider:

• the market positions of the participants;
• the degree of existing competition;
• the availability of substitutes;
• the extent of barriers to entry;
• the likely response of customers and suppliers;
• whether competitors could replace a business that withdraws;
• the likely effect of the arrangement over time.

The analysis is often comparative. It considers the likely competitive conditions with the arrangement and the likely conditions without it. This helps distinguish genuine competitive harm from changes that would have occurred in the market regardless of the conduct.

3.3 Legitimate commercial cooperation

Not every agreement between businesses is harmful. Joint ventures, research partnerships, distribution arrangements, industry standards, and shared infrastructure projects can produce substantial economic benefits.

For example, two businesses may cooperate to develop a new technology that neither could efficiently develop alone. A group of small businesses may negotiate collectively with a powerful supplier. Competitors may share infrastructure to reduce costs or improve service coverage.

Such arrangements can raise competition concerns if they restrict independent decision-making or exclude other market participants. However, their economic purpose and practical effects must be assessed rather than assuming that cooperation is inherently unlawful.

The legal system therefore seeks to distinguish productive collaboration from arrangements that suppress rivalry. Where a proposed arrangement may contravene the law, the parties may consider seeking authorisation or using an applicable notification or class exemption process.

4. Cartel conduct

4.1 Meaning and legal significance

Cartel conduct is among the most serious forms of anti-competitive behaviour under Australian law. It occurs when competitors agree to replace independent commercial decision-making with coordinated conduct that restricts competition.

The CCA prohibits cartel conduct under both civil and criminal provisions. The criminal prohibitions reflect the serious economic harm caused by deliberate collusion between competitors.

A cartel can involve businesses of any size. It may operate in a local market, across Australia, or internationally. The fact that an arrangement is made outside Australia does not necessarily place it beyond Australian competition law if the statutory jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.

The principal forms of cartel conduct are price fixing, market allocation, output restriction, and bid rigging. ACCC+1

4.2 Price fixing

Price fixing occurs when competitors agree to control or maintain the prices at which they buy or sell goods or services.

The agreement may concern:

• a fixed selling price;
• minimum or maximum prices;
• discount levels;
• pricing formulas;
• rebates and allowances;
• credit terms;
• the timing or amount of price increases.

The prohibition is not limited to agreements that establish an identical price. Competitors may unlawfully coordinate only part of their pricing policies or agree to remove particular forms of discounting.

For example, competing construction companies might agree that none will submit a tender below a specified amount. Even if the businesses continue to compete in other respects, the agreement removes an important dimension of price competition.

Independent parallel pricing is different. Businesses may observe competitors’ prices and independently decide to match or adjust their own. Similar prices, standing alone, do not establish a cartel. The critical issue is whether there was an agreement or understanding that satisfies the statutory cartel provisions.

4.3 Market allocation

Market allocation occurs when competitors agree to divide customers, territories, suppliers, or categories of business between themselves.

A group of suppliers might agree that each will operate only in a designated geographical area. Competitors might also agree not to approach one another’s established customers or to divide public contracts among themselves.

Such conduct deprives customers of the opportunity to choose between competing suppliers. It may also prevent new businesses from entering a market because established participants have collectively allocated the available opportunities.

Market allocation can be particularly difficult to detect where the parties continue to submit apparently independent offers or maintain separate public-facing businesses.

4.4 Output restriction

Output restriction involves an agreement between competitors to limit the quantity or type of goods or services available to customers.

For example, competing manufacturers might agree to reduce production in order to maintain higher prices. Service providers could agree to limit the number of customers they accept or to restrict capacity during periods of strong demand.

Businesses may independently reduce production because of declining demand, supply shortages, or operational constraints. The legal concern arises when competitors coordinate restrictions on output as part of prohibited cartel conduct.

4.5 Bid rigging and collusive tendering

Bid rigging occurs when competitors coordinate their responses to a tender or procurement process instead of submitting independent bids.

Common methods include:

• agreeing in advance which competitor will win;
• submitting deliberately inflated bids;
• withdrawing a bid to allow another participant to succeed;
• rotating successful bids between cartel members;
• agreeing that unsuccessful bidders will receive subcontracting work;
• compensating a competitor for not submitting a genuine offer.

Bid rigging can cause significant harm to public authorities and private purchasers. It undermines the integrity of procurement, inflates costs, and may reduce the quality of goods or services acquired.

The conduct is particularly serious in government procurement because taxpayers ultimately bear the cost of artificially inflated contracts. The ACCC has published specific guidance to help businesses and procurement professionals identify and prevent collusive tendering. ACCC+1

4.6 Criminal and civil cartel liability

The CCA provides both criminal and civil consequences for cartel conduct.

Criminal liability may arise where the statutory elements of a cartel offence are established beyond reasonable doubt. Individuals may face imprisonment and substantial fines. Corporations may face very substantial financial penalties.

Civil liability applies under the relevant civil prohibition provisions. The civil standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, although the seriousness of the allegations remains relevant to the court’s assessment of the evidence.

The distinction is important. Criminal prosecution requires the prosecution to establish the offence to the criminal standard. Civil proceedings may result in declarations, pecuniary penalties, injunctions, compensation orders, and other remedies.

Individuals who knowingly participate in cartel arrangements may also face liability even where they are not the owners of the businesses involved. Directors, managers, employees, and other participants should not assume that responsibility rests exclusively with the corporation.

4.7 Compliance and immunity

The ACCC operates a cartel immunity and cooperation framework intended to encourage the disclosure of cartel conduct. A participant who is first to report qualifying conduct and satisfies the relevant conditions may be eligible for immunity from prosecution or civil enforcement action.

Immunity is not automatic. The applicant must meet the applicable requirements, including cooperation with the investigation and the provision of relevant information. Other cartel participants may still face enforcement proceedings.

The existence of an immunity policy is an important enforcement tool because cartel conduct is often difficult to detect through external evidence alone. Participants may possess the most valuable information about the arrangement, its duration, and the individuals involved.

5. Misuse of market power

5.1 Section 46 and substantial market power

Section 46 prohibits a corporation with a substantial degree of power in a market from engaging in conduct that has the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in that market or another market.

The provision does not prohibit a business merely because it is large, profitable, or commercially influential. Nor does it prevent a successful business from competing aggressively.

A company may lawfully obtain a strong market position through innovation, investment, efficiency, superior service, or the development of a product that customers prefer. The law is concerned with the use of substantial market power in ways that harm the competitive process.

Market power generally describes the ability of a business to act with a degree of independence from competitive constraints. A business may possess market power if customers cannot readily switch to alternatives or if competitors cannot expand sufficiently to constrain its conduct.

5.2 Identifying substantial market power

The assessment is fact-specific. Relevant considerations may include:

• market share and the positions of competitors;
• barriers to entry and expansion;
• the availability of substitute products;
• the bargaining power of customers;
• access to important inputs or infrastructure;
• economies of scale and network effects;
• control over distribution channels or essential technology.

Market share can be important evidence, but it is not conclusive by itself. A business with a high share may face strong competitive constraints from imports, emerging technologies, or potential entry. Conversely, a business with a smaller share may possess significant power in a narrowly defined market.

5.3 Examples of potentially unlawful conduct

Conduct that may raise concerns under section 46 includes:

Predatory pricing. A powerful business may deliberately price below an economically sustainable level with the purpose or likely effect of excluding competitors and weakening competition. However, selling below cost is not automatically unlawful. Low prices often benefit consumers and may reflect legitimate efficiency or promotional strategies.

Refusal to deal. A business may generally choose its trading partners. A refusal to supply a competitor is not automatically unlawful. It may raise concerns where a powerful business uses its control over an important input or distribution channel to substantially lessen competition.

Tying and bundling. A business may offer several products together or condition access to one product on the purchase of another. Such arrangements can be commercially efficient, but they may become problematic where they exploit market power to exclude competitors.

Margin or price squeezing. A vertically integrated business may control an important upstream input while also competing with downstream businesses. If the relationship between wholesale and retail prices makes effective downstream competition unviable, the conduct may raise competition concerns.

Restricting access to essential inputs. A powerful business may control infrastructure, technology, or resources that competitors need to operate. Restricting access in circumstances that substantially lessen competition may contravene section 46.

The legality of each practice depends on the statutory test and the evidence. The ACCC expressly recognises that conduct commonly associated with market power is not necessarily unlawful in every situation. ACCC+1

5.4 The importance of competitive effects

The modern Australian approach focuses on the purpose, effect, or likely effect of conduct on competition. This prevents section 46 from becoming a general prohibition against commercial behaviour that disadvantages a rival.

The distinction between harm to a competitor and harm to competition is fundamental. A business may lose customers because a rival is more efficient. That is ordinarily a result of competition, not a reason for legal intervention.

The position changes where the conduct is likely to weaken the competitive constraints that benefit customers and the market as a whole. The law is designed to preserve meaningful rivalry, not to protect inefficient businesses from ordinary commercial pressure.

6. Exclusive dealing

6.1 Meaning and forms

Exclusive dealing occurs where one business imposes conditions on another business’s freedom to choose its suppliers, customers, or trading relationships.

It may take several forms:

• requiring a retailer to purchase all or most of its supplies from one supplier;
• restricting a distributor from dealing with competing manufacturers;
• conditioning a discount on a customer agreeing not to purchase from a rival;
• preventing a supplier from serving a competitor;
• restricting the geographical areas or customer groups to which products may be resold;
• requiring the purchase of an additional product or service as a condition of supply.

Third-line forcing is a particular form of exclusive dealing involving a requirement that a purchaser acquire goods or services from a third party as a condition of receiving a supply or a specified benefit.

6.2 When exclusive dealing is unlawful

Exclusive dealing is not automatically prohibited. Under section 47, the relevant conduct is generally unlawful where it has the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.

The assessment depends on the commercial context. An exclusive distribution agreement in a market with many alternative suppliers may have little effect on competition. The same arrangement may be more concerning where it covers a substantial part of the market and prevents competitors from accessing essential distribution channels.

Factors may include the duration of the restriction, the market position of the parties, the availability of alternative suppliers, and the extent to which the arrangement forecloses competitors.

6.3 Commercial justifications

Exclusive arrangements may promote investment and efficiency. A distributor may be more willing to invest in marketing, training, or specialised equipment if it has some assurance that the supplier will not appoint multiple competing distributors in the same area.

Likewise, a supplier may use selective distribution to protect product quality, technical standards, or customer service.

The existence of a commercial justification does not automatically establish legality. The relevant question remains whether the arrangement substantially lessens competition. ACCC+1

7. Resale price maintenance

7.1 Meaning and prohibition

Resale price maintenance is regulated by section 48 of the CCA. It occurs when a supplier attempts to prevent or restrict a reseller from selling goods or services below a specified minimum price.

The prohibition is intended to preserve the ability of retailers and other resellers to compete on price.

A supplier may recommend a retail price, provide pricing information, or suggest a recommended retail price. The recommendation must remain genuinely non-binding. It becomes problematic when the supplier attempts to enforce it as a minimum resale price.

7.2 Examples

Resale price maintenance may occur where a supplier:

• threatens to stop supplying a retailer that discounts its products;
• withdraws discounts or other benefits because a retailer sells below a specified price;
• refuses to supply a reseller unless it agrees not to discount;
• imposes conditions intended to prevent a reseller from advertising or selling below a minimum price;
• agrees with a reseller that the goods will not be sold below a specified amount.

A supplier may lawfully recommend prices, but it must not use commercial pressure to turn a recommendation into a binding minimum price. ACCC+1

7.3 Why resale price maintenance matters

Minimum resale prices can reduce price competition between retailers. Consumers may face higher prices because retailers are prevented from offering discounts, responding to local demand, or competing through lower margins.

The prohibition is distinct from the general substantial-lessening-of-competition test that applies to several other restrictive practices. Businesses should therefore treat resale price maintenance as a specific compliance risk rather than assuming that a minimum-price arrangement is permissible because the supplier has a relatively small market share.

8. Mergers and acquisitions

8.1 Competition concerns arising from business acquisitions

Mergers and acquisitions can improve economic efficiency, encourage investment, create economies of scale, and allow businesses to develop new products and services. They may also reduce competition by eliminating an important rival, increasing market concentration, or giving an acquiring business control over assets and distribution channels that competitors need.

Australian merger law seeks to prevent acquisitions that harm competition while allowing transactions that are unlikely to create significant competitive problems.

Section 50 of the CCA prohibits acquisitions of shares or assets that have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The prohibition applies to acquisitions by corporations and is not limited to transactions described commercially as mergers. It may also apply to the purchase of a competitor, a business division, particular assets, or a controlling interest in another entity.

The assessment is concerned with the likely competitive consequences of the acquisition, not simply the size of the businesses involved.

8.2 Horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers

Competition analysis commonly distinguishes between three broad types of transactions.

Horizontal mergers involve businesses operating at the same level of the supply chain and competing in the same market. For example, the acquisition of one supermarket chain by another may remove a direct competitor and reduce the number of independent suppliers available to customers.

Vertical mergers involve businesses operating at different levels of a supply chain. A manufacturer may acquire a distributor, or a retailer may acquire a supplier. Vertical integration can reduce costs and improve coordination, but it may also allow the merged business to restrict competitors’ access to important inputs or distribution channels.

Conglomerate mergers involve businesses operating in different but related markets. These transactions may create efficiencies and opportunities to offer complementary products. However, concerns can arise where the merged business can use its position in one market to disadvantage competitors in another.

The categories are analytical tools rather than rigid legal classifications. A transaction may involve several forms of competitive overlap and require examination of multiple markets.

8.3 The substantial lessening of competition test

The central question under section 50 is whether the acquisition has the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.

The analysis may consider:

• whether the merging businesses are close competitors;
• whether customers have realistic alternatives;
• the market shares of the parties and their rivals;
• the likelihood of new entry;
• the strength of existing competitors;
• the possibility of coordinated behaviour after the transaction;
• whether the acquisition gives the merged entity control over important inputs or infrastructure;
• the likelihood that the transaction will affect innovation, quality, or prices.

The inquiry is forward-looking. A court or regulator must assess the likely competitive conditions after the acquisition and compare them with the conditions that would probably exist without it.

The removal of a competitor is not automatically unlawful. A merger may be beneficial where it produces efficiencies, strengthens a business against international competition, or enables investment that would otherwise be difficult. Nevertheless, claimed efficiencies must be examined carefully and cannot simply be assumed to outweigh the loss of competitive rivalry.

8.4 The new mandatory merger notification regime

Australia introduced a major reform of its merger control system on 1 January 2026. Under the new regime, businesses proposing certain acquisitions must notify the ACCC if the applicable thresholds are met. They must ordinarily obtain approval or a notification waiver before completing the transaction.

This represents a significant change from the previous system, which relied predominantly on voluntary notification and the ACCC’s ability to challenge an acquisition under section 50 after examining it.

The new regime is mandatory and suspensory for acquisitions within its scope. This means that a business cannot simply complete a notifiable acquisition and assume that the ACCC will address any competition concerns afterwards.

The ACCC administers the regime through a notification process that includes pre-notification engagement, formal notification, assessment, and a decision on whether the acquisition may proceed. The regulator may approve an acquisition, approve it subject to conditions, or prevent it from proceeding under the statutory framework.

The ACCC indicates that the regime is designed to allow acquisitions unlikely to raise competition concerns to proceed efficiently while permitting more intensive examination of transactions that may create substantial competitive harm. ACCC+1

8.5 Notification thresholds and exemptions

The notification thresholds are prescribed through legislative instruments and are based on factors such as Australian revenue, transaction value, and the relationship between the acquiring business and the target.

The current ACCC guidance identifies a threshold for acquisitions resulting in a large or larger merged firm. In broad terms, notification may be required where the combined Australian revenue of the merger parties reaches at least $200 million and the relevant cumulative Australian revenue from acquisitions involving the same or substitutable goods or services over the preceding three years reaches at least $10 million.

Separate asset-acquisition thresholds apply in specified circumstances. The ACCC’s published guidance distinguishes between large and very large acquirers and considers both Australian revenue and global transaction value. Some of these asset thresholds commenced on 1 April 2026.

The regime also includes exemptions. An acquisition may fall outside the notification requirement even where a monetary threshold appears to be met, depending on the statutory rules and the nature of the transaction. The connection of the target with Australia is also relevant.

These thresholds are not permanent features of the CCA itself in the same way as the substantive section 50 prohibition. They are established through legislative instruments and may be amended. Businesses contemplating transactions should therefore consult the current ACCC thresholds, exemptions, and applicable instruments rather than relying on an old transaction checklist. ACCC+1

8.6 The review process

The new merger control framework provides for different levels of assessment.

An acquisition that appears unlikely to raise significant competition concerns may receive an early decision or be dealt with through a notification waiver where the statutory conditions are met.

More complex transactions may proceed to a fuller review. The ACCC may seek information from the parties, competitors, customers, suppliers, and other interested persons. Public consultation may be particularly important where the transaction affects a concentrated market or essential services.

The review process may involve consideration of proposed remedies. These may include divestiture of assets, changes to contractual arrangements, or other conditions designed to address identified competition concerns.

Where a transaction raises serious concerns, the statutory process provides for more intensive examination and, where applicable, a public benefit assessment. The ACCC’s published process guidelines describe the stages and indicative timeframes, while recognising that the precise timetable depends on the statutory process and circumstances of the case. consultation.accc.gov.au+1

8.7 The consequences of failing to notify

The new regime makes compliance with notification obligations essential. Completing a transaction without required notification or approval can have serious consequences, including the possibility that the acquisition is void and exposure to penalties.

Legislative changes that came into effect on 16 September 2026 addressed matters including the voiding of non-notified transactions, the control exemption, and extensions relating to previously approved notifications. These developments demonstrate why merger compliance must be assessed against the current legislation and instruments, not simply the original 2026 commencement rules. ACCC+1

8.8 The role of the Australian Competition Tribunal

The Australian Competition Tribunal has a role in the statutory review framework for certain merger decisions. Parties dissatisfied with an ACCC determination may, where the legislation permits, seek review through the Tribunal.

The Tribunal’s function is distinct from the ACCC’s initial regulatory assessment. It provides a mechanism for reviewing relevant decisions under the applicable statutory framework. The availability and scope of review depend on the nature of the decision and the governing provisions.

9. Exemptions, authorisation, and notifications

9.1 Why exemptions exist

Competition law recognises that some arrangements that restrict independent business conduct may nevertheless produce public benefits. A joint venture may enable a new product to be developed; collective bargaining may improve the position of small businesses dealing with a powerful purchaser; and an industry-wide arrangement may improve safety or efficiency.

The CCA therefore provides mechanisms through which certain conduct may obtain protection from legal action, even where it might otherwise contravene competition provisions.

The principal mechanisms include authorisation, notifications, and class exemptions. They are not interchangeable. Their availability depends on the nature of the conduct and the relevant statutory requirements.

9.2 Authorisation by the ACCC

Authorisation is a process through which the ACCC may grant protection for proposed conduct that could otherwise breach competition law.

The ACCC assesses the likely competitive effects and public benefits of the arrangement. Depending on the type of conduct, authorisation may be granted where the conduct is not likely to substantially lessen competition or where the likely public benefit outweighs the likely public detriment.

Public benefits may include:

• improved productive efficiency;
• innovation and technological development;
• improved access to goods or services;
• better service quality;
• environmental or sustainability benefits;
• increased economic participation;
• improved coordination in circumstances where independent activity would be inefficient.

The process normally involves a public application and consultation with interested parties. The ACCC may issue a draft determination before reaching a final decision. Authorisation may be subject to conditions and may operate for a specified period.

It is important to understand that authorisation is not a general declaration that a business model is lawful in all circumstances. It provides protection for the conduct described in the application, subject to the terms and conditions of the authorisation. ACCC+1

9.3 Notifications

Certain forms of conduct may obtain protection through a notification process. Notification is generally simpler than authorisation and is available only for conduct and circumstances covered by the relevant statutory provisions.

For example, notification may be relevant to certain exclusive dealing arrangements or collective bargaining activities. The ACCC can assess whether the conduct is likely to substantially lessen competition and whether the public benefit justifies allowing it to proceed.

A business should not assume that lodging a document with the ACCC automatically protects every aspect of an arrangement. The statutory requirements, the scope of the notification, and the commencement of protection must be checked carefully.

9.4 Class exemptions

The ACCC may establish class exemptions for categories of conduct that meet specified conditions. A class exemption can allow businesses falling within its scope to engage in certain conduct without making individual applications for authorisation or notification.

Collective bargaining by qualifying small businesses is an example of an area in which class exemptions may be relevant. They can reduce compliance costs and make lawful cooperation more accessible to businesses that lack the resources to pursue a complex individual application.

The availability of a class exemption does not mean that every arrangement described as collective bargaining is automatically protected. Businesses must satisfy the applicable eligibility and procedural conditions.

10. Competition law and regulated industries

10.1 Competition regulation beyond ordinary commercial markets

The general competition provisions apply across the economy, but some industries also operate under specialised regulatory frameworks.

These sectors may have characteristics that make ordinary market competition difficult. Examples include network industries, infrastructure, utilities, telecommunications, and markets where access to essential facilities is important.

The ACCC has responsibilities under several specialised regulatory regimes, including functions relating to access to infrastructure and economic regulation. Its work in these areas may involve monitoring prices, assessing access arrangements, and regulating conduct under sector-specific legislation.

10.2 Infrastructure access

Some businesses control infrastructure that competitors need to provide services. Examples may include rail networks, ports, pipelines, electricity infrastructure, or telecommunications facilities.

Where duplication would be economically impractical, access regulation can help ensure that infrastructure owners do not use their position to exclude competing service providers.

The CCA contains a national access regime in Part IIIA. It establishes a framework for considering access to certain services supplied by significant infrastructure facilities. The regime is designed to promote competition in markets dependent on those services while taking account of the interests of infrastructure owners and the need to encourage investment.

Access regulation is not equivalent to a general obligation for every business to supply competitors. The statutory requirements and the characteristics of the relevant service must be satisfied.

10.3 Digital markets and technology

Digital markets raise distinctive competition issues. A platform may connect different groups of users, benefit from network effects, collect extensive data, or control an important route through which businesses reach customers.

A platform can become difficult to challenge where users attract more users, merchants depend on access to its customer base, and competitors struggle to reproduce the same scale or data resources.

Potential competition concerns include:

• self-preferencing by a platform that also competes with businesses using its services;
• restrictions on multi-homing or switching;
• tying or bundling of services;
• exclusionary access conditions;
• acquisitions of emerging competitors;
• control over data or interoperability.

These practices are not automatically unlawful. Their legality depends on the relevant statutory provisions and evidence of competitive effects. Nevertheless, digital markets have become an important focus of competition analysis because their structure can change rapidly and market power may be exercised through control over access, data, or platform rules rather than simply through prices.

10.4 International competition and cross-border conduct

Australian competition law may apply to conduct involving foreign businesses where the statutory jurisdictional requirements are met. International cartels, cross-border mergers, and arrangements involving overseas suppliers may therefore fall within the reach of Australian enforcement.

The ACCC may cooperate with overseas competition authorities, exchange information where legally permitted, and coordinate aspects of investigations involving multinational businesses.

Cross-border cooperation is increasingly important because a merger or cartel arrangement may affect several national markets at once. However, the existence of an overseas regulatory approval does not necessarily remove the need to comply with Australian law.

11. Enforcement, penalties, and remedies

11.1 Civil enforcement proceedings

The ACCC may commence proceedings in the Federal Court where it considers that a business or individual has contravened competition law.

Civil enforcement proceedings may seek:

• declarations that the law has been contravened;
• pecuniary penalties;
• injunctions restraining continuing or threatened conduct;
• orders requiring corrective action;
• compensation or other forms of redress where legally available;
• disqualification of individuals from managing corporations.

The Federal Court determines whether the relevant statutory requirements have been satisfied and what remedies are appropriate.

11.2 Pecuniary penalties

Competition law breaches can attract substantial financial penalties. The maximum penalty depends on the provision, the type of contravention, the date of the conduct, and whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.

For many civil contraventions of Part IV, the maximum pecuniary penalty for a corporation is the greatest of:

• $100 million;
• three times the value of the reasonably attributable benefit obtained; or
• where that benefit cannot be determined, 30 per cent of the corporation’s adjusted turnover during the relevant breach turnover period.

For individuals, the maximum civil pecuniary penalty for many Part IV contraventions is $2.5 million.

Criminal cartel offences have separate penalty provisions. Individuals may face imprisonment of up to ten years, as well as substantial fines. Corporate criminal penalties are calculated under the applicable statutory rules.

The ACCC’s current penalty guidance reflects increases that took effect on 28 March 2026. It also explains that the maximum penalty is not automatically imposed whenever a contravention is established. The court determines the appropriate penalty by considering the statutory framework and the circumstances of the case. ACCC+2

11.3 Factors affecting penalties

In determining a penalty, the court may consider:

• the nature and seriousness of the conduct;
• the duration and frequency of the contravention;
• the role of the individuals involved;
• the degree of deliberateness;
• the benefit obtained;
• the loss or damage caused;
• the size and financial position of the corporation;
• the need for deterrence;
• cooperation with the regulator;
• corrective measures and compliance improvements.

The purpose of penalties is not merely to compensate those affected. They also serve a deterrent function by discouraging businesses and individuals from treating competition law violations as commercially acceptable risks.

11.4 Criminal proceedings

Serious cartel conduct may be referred for criminal prosecution. The criminal standard of proof applies, and the prosecution must establish the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

The possibility of imprisonment distinguishes criminal cartel enforcement from most other forms of competition law liability. It reflects the seriousness with which Australian law treats deliberate collusion between competitors.

A corporation may face criminal liability, while individuals involved in the conduct may also be prosecuted. The precise liability of each person depends on the evidence and the statutory elements.

11.5 Private actions and compensation

Competition law enforcement is not limited to proceedings brought by the ACCC. Private parties who have suffered loss or damage because of a contravention may have rights to bring proceedings under the CCA.

A business harmed by a cartel, exclusionary arrangement, or anti-competitive acquisition may seek compensation where the statutory requirements are satisfied. Consumers and other affected parties may also have rights depending on the nature of the conduct and the loss suffered.

Private enforcement can complement public enforcement. The ACCC may pursue conduct because of its broader impact on competition, while private litigation may focus on the losses suffered by a particular business or group.

However, proving a contravention and establishing a causal connection between the conduct and the claimed loss can be complex. The claimant must identify the relevant legal basis, establish the necessary elements, and substantiate the loss.

11.6 Injunctions and other court orders

An injunction may restrain a business from engaging in conduct that contravenes competition law or from continuing conduct that is already unlawful.

Courts may also make other orders available under the CCA, including orders designed to address the consequences of the contravention. Depending on the circumstances, these may involve corrective steps, compensation, or other measures authorised by statute.

The purpose of remedies is to respond to the legal breach and, where possible, restore competitive conditions or address harm caused by the conduct.

12. Important Australian competition law cases

Australian competition law has developed through legislation and judicial interpretation. The following decisions illustrate several central principles.

12.1 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177

This High Court decision is an important early authority concerning the use of market power. It involved a dominant steel producer’s refusal to supply a particular steel product to a downstream manufacturer.

The case examined the relationship between market power, refusal to supply, and competitive disadvantage. It remains significant in understanding the development of Australian law on exclusionary conduct and the regulation of powerful businesses.

12.2 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1

This High Court decision concerned a refusal to supply a distributor in the context of a distribution system. It illustrates that a refusal to supply is not automatically unlawful merely because the supplier has a strong market position.

The case is relevant to the distinction between legitimate commercial distribution arrangements and conduct that may constitute misuse of market power.

12.3 Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53

This case concerned an arrangement between competing newspaper publishers and the application of the competition provisions to conduct affecting market entry and rivalry.

The High Court’s decision is important for understanding the statutory analysis of anti-competitive arrangements and the need to establish the relevant competitive effect.

12.4 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 215 CLR 374

The High Court considered allegations of misuse of market power involving aggressive pricing in a concentrated market.

The decision demonstrates that low prices and competitive pressure cannot simply be equated with unlawful conduct. The statutory elements must be established, and the analysis must distinguish competitive behaviour from conduct that harms the competitive process.

12.5 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Travel Group Ltd [2016] HCA 49

This High Court decision concerned alleged price fixing by a travel agent in relation to airfares. It examined the relationship between the parties and whether they were in competition for the relevant services.

The case is significant because it illustrates that competition analysis depends on the economic relationship between the parties, not merely on the labels they use in their commercial arrangements.

12.6 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 159

This Federal Court of Australia Full Court decision concerned arrangements involving cement companies and the acquisition of fly ash, a by-product used in cement production.

The case is relevant to the assessment of anti-competitive arrangements, market conditions, and the legal treatment of conduct that may affect access to important inputs.

12.7 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54

Although primarily a consumer law decision, this High Court case is relevant to the broader role of the ACCC and its enforcement responsibilities. It concerned misleading advertising and the interpretation of representations made to consumers.

It illustrates the importance of distinguishing competition regulation from consumer protection, while recognising that both operate within the same statutory framework.

These cases demonstrate that competition law is not applied through simple assumptions about company size, market share, pricing, or commercial success. The legal analysis requires careful attention to statutory language, market conditions, and evidence of the conduct’s competitive consequences.

13. Practical compliance obligations for businesses

Competition law compliance should form part of ordinary corporate governance and commercial risk management. Businesses should not wait until the ACCC begins an investigation before examining the legality of their arrangements.

A practical compliance programme should address the following areas.

Competitor communications. Employees should understand that discussions with competitors about prices, discounts, customers, tenders, output, or market allocation can create serious legal risks. Informal conversations at industry events may be relevant just as much as written agreements.

Tender procedures. Businesses participating in procurement should maintain independent pricing and bidding processes. Employees should not share confidential tender information with competitors or coordinate the submission of bids.

Distribution agreements. Exclusive supply and distribution arrangements should be reviewed for their effect on market access and competition. Restrictions should be proportionate to legitimate commercial objectives and assessed against the applicable statutory tests.

Pricing policies. Suppliers should ensure that recommended resale prices remain genuinely non-binding. Retailers should retain independent control over their resale prices.

Market power. Businesses with substantial market power should assess whether proposed conduct could exclude competitors or materially weaken competitive constraints. Commercial justifications should be documented where they are relevant to the decision.

Mergers and acquisitions. Transaction planning should include an early assessment of whether notification is required under the mandatory merger regime. The parties should not assume that a transaction can be completed while the ACCC’s review is pending.

Training and reporting. Employees should have access to clear competition law policies and a mechanism for raising concerns. Management should respond promptly to indications of improper coordination or pressure from competitors.

Legal review. Complex arrangements, joint ventures, industry collaborations, and acquisitions should be assessed by appropriately qualified legal advisers before implementation.

A compliance programme cannot guarantee that a contravention will never occur. However, it can reduce risk, improve internal awareness, and help a business identify problems before they become serious regulatory matters.

14. Key Takeaways

• Australian competition law is principally governed by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), particularly Part IV.
• The ACCC is the principal national regulator responsible for investigating and enforcing competition law.
• The law protects the competitive process rather than individual businesses from ordinary commercial rivalry.
• Section 45 prohibits specified agreements and concerted practices that have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.
• Cartel conduct includes price fixing, market allocation, output restriction, and bid rigging. It may attract both civil and criminal liability.
• Section 46 prohibits corporations with substantial market power from engaging in conduct that has the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.
• Exclusive dealing is generally prohibited where it substantially lessens competition, while resale price maintenance is subject to a specific statutory prohibition.
• Section 50 regulates acquisitions that substantially lessen competition.
• Since 1 January 2026, certain acquisitions must be notified to the ACCC and approved before completion under Australia’s mandatory merger control regime.
• Authorisation, notifications, and class exemptions can provide protection for certain arrangements that might otherwise contravene competition law.
• The Federal Court determines contested competition proceedings and may impose substantial penalties and other remedies.
• Businesses should maintain effective competition compliance policies, particularly in relation to competitor communications, pricing, tendering, distribution agreements, and mergers.

15. Frequently Asked Questions

1. What is the main competition law in Australia?

The principal legislation is the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). Its Part IV contains the principal prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements, cartel conduct, misuse of market power, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, and anti-competitive acquisitions.

2. What is the role of the ACCC?

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission investigates suspected breaches of competition and consumer law, reviews mergers, monitors markets, administers authorisation and notification processes, and brings enforcement proceedings. It also publishes compliance guidance and reports on competition issues.

The ACCC is a regulator, not a court. Contested proceedings and judicial penalties are determined by the courts.

3. Is it illegal for competitors to charge the same prices?

Not necessarily. Businesses may independently choose similar prices or respond to the same economic conditions. The legal problem arises when competitors agree or coordinate their pricing in a way that constitutes prohibited cartel conduct or another anti-competitive arrangement.

Price similarity alone does not prove price fixing.

4. What are the four main types of cartel conduct?

The four principal forms are:

1. Price fixing.
2. Market allocation.
3. Output restriction.
4. Bid rigging.

These arrangements replace independent competition with coordination between competitors and are prohibited under Australian competition law.

5. Is having a monopoly illegal in Australia?

No. A business is not automatically acting unlawfully because it has a monopoly or a substantial market share. A company may become dominant through innovation, investment, efficiency, or commercial success.

However, a corporation with substantial market power must not engage in conduct prohibited by section 46, including conduct with the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.

6. Is selling products below cost illegal?

Generally, no. Businesses may offer discounts, conduct promotions, or sell below cost to attract customers. Such conduct can be an ordinary aspect of competition.

Predatory pricing may raise concerns under section 46 where a business with substantial market power engages in the conduct with the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.

7. What is exclusive dealing?

Exclusive dealing involves imposing conditions on another business’s freedom to choose its suppliers, customers, or commercial relationships. Examples include requiring a retailer to purchase exclusively from one supplier or restricting a distributor from dealing with competing manufacturers.

It is generally prohibited where it substantially lessens competition.

8. Can a supplier require retailers to follow its recommended prices?

A supplier may recommend resale prices, but it must not impose or enforce minimum resale prices in a manner prohibited by section 48.

For example, threatening to stop supplying a retailer because it discounts products may constitute resale price maintenance.

9. Does the ACCC have to approve every merger in Australia?

No. The mandatory notification regime applies to acquisitions that meet the relevant statutory thresholds and requirements, subject to applicable exemptions.

Businesses should assess notification obligations before completing a transaction. The thresholds and exemptions should be checked against the current ACCC guidance and legislative instruments.

10. What happens if a business completes a notifiable acquisition without approval?

The consequences can be serious. Depending on the circumstances and applicable statutory provisions, an acquisition completed without required notification or approval may be void and may expose the parties to penalties or other legal consequences.

The new regime is designed to ensure that qualifying acquisitions are assessed before they are completed.

11. Can businesses cooperate without breaching competition law?

Yes. Joint ventures, research partnerships, collective bargaining, infrastructure-sharing arrangements, and other forms of cooperation may be lawful.

However, an arrangement that restricts independent competition may require careful assessment. Depending on the circumstances, authorisation, notification, or an applicable class exemption may provide protection.

12. Can an individual employee be liable for cartel conduct?

Yes. Individuals who participate in prohibited cartel conduct may face personal civil or criminal liability. Criminal cartel offences can result in imprisonment, while civil contraventions may attract substantial pecuniary penalties.

Employees and directors should therefore understand that competition law obligations are not confined to the corporation as a legal entity.

13. Can a business sue another business for anti-competitive conduct?

Yes, where the statutory requirements for a private action are satisfied. A business that suffers loss or damage because of a contravention may be able to bring proceedings seeking compensation or other available remedies.

The claimant must establish the relevant contravention and demonstrate the required connection between the conduct and the loss suffered.

14. Does Australian competition law apply to foreign businesses?

It can. Foreign businesses may fall within the reach of Australian competition law where the statutory jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. International cartels, cross-border acquisitions, and conduct affecting Australian markets may therefore attract Australian regulatory attention.

15. Why does competition law matter to consumers?

Competition encourages businesses to offer better prices, improve quality, develop new products, and provide more choice. When competitors coordinate their behaviour or powerful businesses exclude rivals, consumers may face higher prices, fewer alternatives, reduced innovation, and lower service standards.

Competition law helps preserve the conditions in which consumers and businesses can benefit from genuine market rivalry.

Conclusion

Competition law is one of the principal instruments through which Australia regulates the operation of its market economy. It establishes boundaries between legitimate commercial freedom and conduct that undermines the competitive process. Businesses remain free to innovate, expand, compete aggressively, negotiate commercial arrangements, and pursue profitable opportunities. They cannot, however, replace independent competition with prohibited coordination, misuse substantial market power to weaken competitive constraints, impose unlawful resale price restrictions, or undertake acquisitions that substantially lessen competition.

The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 provides the substantive legal framework, while the ACCC performs the central investigative and enforcement role. Courts determine contested liability and impose the penalties and remedies authorised by law. The system also recognises that some forms of commercial cooperation can produce substantial public benefits, providing mechanisms through which qualifying arrangements may obtain authorisation or other forms of protection.

The introduction of mandatory merger notification in 2026 represents a particularly important development. It strengthens the preventive dimension of Australian competition regulation by requiring qualifying acquisitions to undergo scrutiny before completion. Businesses must consequently consider competition law not only when responding to investigations but also when designing commercial agreements, setting distribution policies, negotiating with competitors, and planning acquisitions.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of competition law depends on maintaining a balance. Excessive intervention could discourage investment and legitimate commercial risk-taking; insufficient enforcement could allow dominant businesses and coordinated market participants to restrict opportunities for others. Australian competition law seeks to preserve that balance by protecting the competitive process, encouraging efficient markets, and ensuring that commercial success is achieved through lawful competition rather than the suppression of it.

Further Reading and Primary Legal Sources

The following official sources provide the principal legislation, regulatory guidance, and institutional information relevant to Australian competition law.

1. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) — the principal legislation governing competition and consumer protection in Australia.
Federal Register of Legislation – Competition and Consumer Act 2010

2. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) — official information about competition regulation, enforcement, and business obligations.
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

3. ACCC – Competition and Anti-competitive Behaviour — overview of prohibited business practices and the competition framework.
Competition and Anti-competitive Behaviour

4. ACCC – Cartels — guidance on price fixing, market allocation, output restriction, bid rigging, and cartel enforcement.
Cartels

5. ACCC – Misuse of Market Power — explanation of section 46 and the prohibition against conduct by businesses with substantial market power.
Misuse of Market Power

6. ACCC – Exclusive Dealing — information about exclusive dealing arrangements and their potential competitive effects.
Exclusive Dealing

7. ACCC – Minimum Resale Prices — guidance on resale price maintenance and permissible recommended retail prices.
Minimum Resale Prices

8. ACCC – Mergers and Acquisitions — official information about the mandatory merger control regime, notification obligations, review processes, and decisions.
Mergers and Acquisitions

9. ACCC – Thresholds for Notifying Acquisitions — current guidance on merger notification thresholds and exemptions.
Thresholds for Notifying Acquisitions

10. ACCC – Authorisation — information about exemptions for conduct that may otherwise contravene competition law.
Authorisation

11. ACCC – Fines and Penalties — explanation of civil and criminal penalties under the CCA and Australian Consumer Law.
Fines and Penalties

12. Federal Court of Australia — judgments and information concerning federal competition litigation.
Federal Court of Australia

13. Australian Competition Tribunal — information about the Tribunal and its statutory review functions.
Australian Competition Tribunal

14. Treasury – Competition Policy — government policy material concerning competition and economic regulation.
Australian Government Department of the Treasury

This article is intended for legal education and general information. It provides an overview of the Australian competition law framework and is not a substitute for advice on a particular transaction, investigation, or commercial arrangement.

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